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Commentary: Imprisonment Focus of Sentencing Reform.

The Misplaced

Andrea Monsees*
In assessing recent sentencing reforms, particularly the assault
on discretion-ridden indeterminate sentencing, Professor Zimring
demonstrates that disparate interest groups' generated the move
toward determinate sentencing. Each group had targeted the combined sentencing discretion of judges, prosecutors and parole
boards as the wellspring of defects in indeterminate sentencing
systems. When Professor Zimring measures determinate sentencing against the amount of discretion retained, he observes that the
redistribution of sentencing power worked by determinate reforms
has done little to reduce overall discretion in sentencing.' The shift
to determinate sentencing was a change without substantial reform, he concludes, and unforeseen harm will result from determinate sentencing legislation which inadvertently promotes sentencing disparities' and leaves unchecked the growth of prison
population.4
*

Associate Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University. B.S., Valparaiso

University, 1970; J.D., Valparaiso University, 1971.
1. The "prisoners, professors, and politicians" of which Professor Zimring
speaks all had different reasons for opposing indeterminate systems in which a
convict faced an indefinite term of incarceration until "rehabilitated." Prisoners
focused on the unrealistic expectations of rehabilitation within brutalizing prison
systems; politicians addressed the insult to "law and order" when a parole board
released a convict who had not served a minimum sentence; "liberal" professors
deplored the inequality to prisoners sentenced for the same offense who served
widely different sentences; and "conservative" professors argued that broad sentencing discretion undercut the certainty of punishment essential to effective deterrence. See Zimring, Sentencing Reform in the States: Some Sobering Lessons
from the 1970's, 2 N. ILL. U.L. REv. 1 (1981).
2. "The only concrete advantage of the new system is reduction of uncertainty about sentence length after the judge pronounces sentence. This could have
been accomplished by providing early time-fixing by parole boards." Id. at 14.
3. Professor Zimring suggests that the shift of sentencing discretion from parole boards to judges eliminates the homogenizing effect of a state-wide sentencing board and may promote the development of decentralized, county-wide and
individual sentencing policies that vary greatly among counties or even among
judges. Id. at 15, 18.
4. In some states (e.g., Illinois) the sentencing judge has discretion whether
to imprison, but not to select the minimum time to be served. Professor Zimring
suggests that this discretion in the choice of imprisonment effectively permits lo-
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While he identifies several problems created by determinate
sentencing reforms, 5 Professor Zimring implies that a solution to
the sentencing problem does exist: if we develop "a coherent theory of why we imprison," tie sentencing factors to substantive
criminal law,7 develop "coherent affirmative principles about the
use of imprisonment," s relate the available prison space to sentencing policy,9 and avoid the pitfalls of partial reform, 10 we will have
either an improved sentencing system-or one that does not duplicate our current problems.
Several assumptions are implicit in his assertions: (1) sentencing policy is uniquely an outgrowth of the purposes of criminal law;
(2) imprisonment is an essential component of sentencing policy;
and (3) prison space is an appropriate resource around which to
structure sentencing policy.
I suggest that these assumptions are faulty. Sentencing policy
and its development are more essential to the life of the state than
to the purposes assigned to criminal law." Imprisonment itself is
cal judges to decide prison policy for the entire state. Id. at 18.
5. Professor Zimring identifies several problems to be anticipated in the future. Partial reform will reallocate but not eliminate identified problems, just as
discretion was shifted but not substantially reduced with determinate sentencing.
The "negative coalition" of diverse interest groups will effect their congruent
aims, but ultimately ignore, or undermine, the values that motivate their demands for reform. An appearance of equality will be achieved at the cost of equity; as in Illinois the new "determinate" terms do not permit individualized
treatment of the offender who deserves less than the minimum imprisonment but
who does not merit probation. The development of a substantive law of sentencing will be inhibited to the extent that sentence ranges are set without reference
to the nature and degree of the offense committed or to the purposes to be served
by imprisonment. Finally, each change in sentencing policy itself will create
prison conditions that again demand a new sentencing policy. Id. at 15-18.
6. Id. at 17.
7. Id. See also Swift, Commentary: The Imprisonment Decision-Why Not
Try Something Old?, 2 N. ILL. U.L. REv. 33 (1981).
8. Zimring, supra note 1, at 16.
9. Id. at 18.
10. Id. at 15.
11. The generally recognized purposes of punishment are linked to the goals
of criminal law. General deterrence operates on the assumption that there is a
way of penalizing that will dissuade most people from committing a particular
offense. Specific or special deterrence seeks to incapacitate a convicted offender,
most narrowly by isolation from society (imprisonment); it also contains elements
of aversive conditioning, the assumption being that, having been punished once,
the convict will "think twice" before again breaking the law. Retribution is the
"right" of the state and serves many purposes: vindication of public law and or-
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not the sine qua non of penal policy but rather a stop-gap, an institutional anachronism that is neither essential to sentencing policy nor a resource around which to structure such a policy. The
debate over determinate/indeterminate sentencing will never be resolved because there is a consistent failure to look beyond imprisonment and its relationship to criminal law to the more fundamental issue of punishment and its relationship to the state and
society.
Independent of the traditionally defined purposes of criminal
law enforcement-deterrence, retribution and rehabilitationpunishment is essential to the existence of the state. Moreover,
within a state the methods of punishment develop chiefly from the
interplay between the state's interest in its authority and resources
and the public's interest in its own morality."2 Significant and lasting changes in the methods of punishment are often preceded by a
need to centralize state authority, a political crisis, financial exigencies, or an expansion or contraction of resources. These fundamental factors mold our acceptance of particular penalties. The
key factor creating the most effective reform is the successful, i.e.
profitable, exploitation of the state's resources in the administration of penal policy. We are now in the cul-de-sac of imprisonment
because we have not followed the lessons of history and have not
integrated our modern resources of science and technology into the
penal system.
der, reinforcement of lawful conduct, and general education as to what acts invoke punishment. Rehabilitation is the process by which a convict ideally will be
restored to society as a law-abiding citizen.
While not mutually exclusive, each of these goals has been advanced as the
principle around which a criminal justice system must be organized to effect all
the remaining purposes. As Professor Haddad points out, the ascendancy of one
rationale for punishment is not necessarily linked to any particular practice.
Therefore, both deterrence and rehabilitation theories are alternately found with
determinate and indeterminate practices. See, Haddad, Some Lessons from the
History of Illinois Sentencing Laws, 2 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 19 (1981).

12. Contemporary values have-greatly influenced changes in punishment. For
example, between 1810 and 1860 jury nullification was so prevalent for capital
offenses against property that the number of offenses punishable by hanging in
England was reduced from nearly two hundred to four. The punishment reduction was essential if the state was to have workable laws that juries would apply.

See J. GOLDSTEIN, A.

DERSHOWITZ

& R.

SCHWARTZ, CRIMINAL LAW: THEORY AND

PROCESS 342 (1974). This public sense of leniency may itself be attributable to the
alternative punishment of transportation that had been available in preceding

centuries. See note 36 and accompanying text infra.
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PUNISHMENT AS ESSENTIAL TO THE EXISTENCE OF THE STATE

A state expresses and enforces the ideal of order through laws
which regulate interrelationships among individuals and between
individuals and the state. A common denominator of laws is that
some official sanction attaches to their violation. Obviously, a sanction does not create a law; if it did, every order, personal, corporate
or official, accompanied by a real threat of punishment, would be
elevated to the status of law. Nonetheless, it is probably correct to
say that punishment is necessary for a rule to be law;'$ absent the
threat and exercise of punishment for transgression, a command
would be no more than a guideline, suggestion, recommendation or
aspiration.
The need to punish, by itself, does not validate any particular
punishment. While the authority to punish is directly linked to the
state's law-making power, both the magnitude and methods of
punishment correspond to the needs of the state. 14 If we accept law
13. For an exposition of retributive punishment as "included within the very
concept of law," see.Fingarette, Rethinking Criminal Law Excuses, 89 YALE L. J.
1002, 1013-1015 (1980); Fingarette, Punishment and Suffering, 50 PROCEEDINGS
AND ADDRESSES, AM. PHILOSOPHICAL ASS'N. 499 (1977).
14. "Method" and "magnitude" of punishment are not entirely separate and
any distinction between them is of necessity artificial. Method refers to the
"hows" of punishment, the type of punishment inflicted, e.g., a preference for
public flogging, imprisonment, maiming, probation, etc., while magnitude indicates the degree of punishment acceptable within an' established penal system,
e.g., larceny as a capital offense versus larceny punishable by a term of
imprisonment.
In a social contract analysis the magnitude of permissible punishment assures
citizens that nothing has been "lost" in the transfer of authority to the state, that
they are not participating in a bad bargain. The state's potential authority is
what society would tolerate as retribution in the absence of the state. This is illustrated by contrasting limits on the permissible use of deadly force by the individual and by the state. The state may exercise force beyond the constraints of nonretaliation and proportionality against which private acts are measured. While
there is growing authority for the proposition that the punishment for an offense
must bear some relation to the offense committed, there is no requirement that
the magnitude of punishment be limited to that necessary to neutralize the threat
a defendant poses to society. If there were, the death penalty would be indefensible since a convicted person's threat to society may be neutralized by total isolation from society-including the society of his fellow inmates.
Blackstone offered a different rationale:
[Ihf any measure of punishment is to be taken from the damage sustained by the sufferer, the punishment ought rather to exceed than equal
the injury: since it seems contrary to reason and equity, that the guilty
(if convicted) should suffer no more than the innocent has done before
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as essential to the state, then we must accept the necessity of punishment. To assess punishment reforms, therefore, we must examine the state's needs which create the impetus for those reforms.
Centralizationof State Authority
While the importance of punishment to the existence of a
state is abstract, the role played by the administration of punishment in the development and perpetuation of a centralized state is
real. Originally, punishment was meted out on a communal and
private basis. As society developed, there was a change in the theoretical basis for its imposition and in the agent to which it accrued.
The formal imposition of punishment centralized the state, organized lines of authority within it, and collaterally was a source of
revenue through which loyalties were affirmed and alliances purchased. 16 The compensation once due the victim as restoration for
an injury became a sentence due the state for a breach of its order.
This organizing function of punishment is difficult to tease away
from our day to day conduct. If we look, however, to the period of
the Norman Conquest of England, we can see how the methods of
punishment and the benefits and profits derived from punishment
affect the allocation of administrative responsibility.
Before the Norman Conquest of England, society warred with
outlawed criminals; 16 all men were free, if not obliged, to hunt and
kill these criminals, and to lay waste their property.17 Penalties
him; especially as the suffering of the innocent is past and irrevocable,
that of the guilty is future, contingent, liable to be escaped or evaded.
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *14.
15. The revenue or profit aspect of punishment permeates the development
of Anglo-American criminal law. The use to which the profits derived from punishment are put varies with the stage of technology and with the immediate needs
of the state. For example, Elizabeth I authorized the use of involuntary servitude
as a system of reprieve from the death penalty. Service as oarsmen on a galley was
to be carried out so that the convicts would be corrected and punished and at the
same time their punishment would yield some profit to the Commonwealth. See
L. ORLAND, PRISONS: HOUSES OF DARKNESS 17 (1975).
16. Outlawry put a person outside the protection of the law. He could not
bring an action for redress of injuries; all his goods and chattels were forfeited. 3.
W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *284.
17. Pollock and Maitland give this description of outlawry:
He who breakes the law has gone to war with the community; the community goes to war with him. It is the right and duty of every man to
pursue him, to ravage his land, to burn his house, to hunt him down like
a wild beast and slay him; for a wild beast he is; not merely is he a

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

were primarily personal redress for the victim or his next of kin.
By the time of the Conquest, the extreme capital penalties of outlawry and blood-feud 8 were confined to wrong-doers who defaulted in compensatory payment. 19 Fines, mulcts and tariffs were
the preferred method of "punishment." This shift from communal
retributive penalties, which demanded an eye for an eye, to compensatory financial penalties improved the general level of order
throughout England. Private vendettas no longer escalated into
countryside upheavals, and a well-regulated system of punishment
was the background on which centralization of the state could
advance.
The ascendancy of compensatory payment also made the administration of justice profitable. With the Norman Conquest the
Crown used fines and tariffs along with the expansion of the king's
peace 20 to centralize the feudal state. Norman kings sold franchises

for the administration of justice to loyal supporters, providing
ready capital for the king and a source of income for the newly
transplanted Norman nobility.2 1 Ultimately, the profits derived
'friendless man,' he is a wolf.
The authors go on to note that as a form of action outlawry had lost its "exterminating character" by the thirteenth century, but that a residue of its character
was to be found as late as the nineteenth century practice of according the king a
"'year, day [possession] and waste [use]' of the felon's land."- 2 F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 449-50 (2d ed. 1898) [hereinafter cited
as POLLOCK & MAITLAND].

18. Blood-feud was a legal vendetta. A slain man's kin could take the life of
his killer or his killer's kin. Id. at 450.
19. Outlawry slowly became a form of process against the contumacious. By
the end of the twelfth century outlawry had ceased being a punishment and had
become a process to compel the attendance of the accused. Id. at 450 n.2, 459.
20. Every man had his own "peace" which included his person and his home.
It was breach of this peace that occasioned retributive and compensatory penalties. Expansion of the king's peace began in the time of Cnut who bestowed his
peace on individuals by a writ of protection. Later, William the Conqueror included within his peace all Normans he had brought to England. At the close of
the thirteenth century the king's peace extended to all public places. Id. at 45356.
Ultimately, the king's peace came to represent the normal state of society
and to embody the prerogative of the monarch to maintain peace and social order.
See 1 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 184-85 (1883).
21. The Norman kings followed a practice begun by Cnut and sold regalia
and franchises for the administration of justice. Not only did this provide revenue
for the royal treasury but it also strengthened the implication that justice, like
seisin, was of the king, thereby laying a foundation for the emergence of the king's
courts. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 17, at 452-59.
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from assessing penalties, collecting fines and exploiting forfeitures

came directly within the administration of the Crown and the
king's courts,2 2 forming the basis for our current view that legal

duties and penalties are owed to and administered by the state.
Thus, we see that the "reform" of punishment away from communal and private sanctions toward state collection of payments had
little to do with the purposes punishment serves as to the individ-

ual offender and the criminal law. The "proper" type of punishment was dictated by the interests of the state in its authority and
financial needs.
Punishment and Political Crisis

The effect of political struggles is another factor that causes
substantial and lasting reform of penal principles. Henry I's refusal

to adhere to the terms of his coronation charter and Henry II's

conflict with Becket are illustrative of this point. The former intro-

duced individualization of punishment into the criminal law,"' and

the latter led to first-offender laws in a period when leniency had

no place in the legal decision-making process but was exclusively a
royal prerogative.' 4 Unlike the recent reform movement described

by Professor Zimring or the cyclical revisions illustrated by Professor Haddad, neither of these historical struggles had as its focus
22. Id. at 461-66, 511-16.
23. Henry I's coronation charter provided that fines would be assessed on the
basis of a pre-appointed schedule, each offense to have its fixed penalty (wite). By
breaching this provision of the charter, Henry I put the entirety of an offender's
goods at his mercy and then selected the amount the offender was to pay in lieu
of total forfeiture (amercement). He opened the door to individualization of penalties-making the punishment fit the person as well as the crime.
Account can now be taken of the offender's wealth or poverty, of the
provocation that has been given him, of all those 'circumstances of the
particular case' that the rigid rules of ancient law had ignored. So the
misericordia [being at the king's mercy], when the central power is
strong, begins to devour the old wites [fixed and absolute penalties].
2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 17, at 514.
24. Id. at 512-14.
Judicial franchises often partook of the king's discretion and the judge could
allow a capital offense to be emended by fine or could impose a lesser physical
punishment. By the thirteenth century many crimes were unemendable and a
convict forfeited not only life but all possessions to the Crown. Nonetheless,
judges sometimes substituted maiming for death. In the late thirteenth century
non-discretionary penalties (determinate imprisonment among them) began to
appear by statute. Only the king's pardon or clemency could remit determinate,
non-discretionary penalties. Id. at 460-62, 491-93, 514-18.
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the "proper" methods of punishment nor the "purposes" punishment served within the criminal law. Each was concerned with
more fundamental questions of power and the division of authority
within the state. Yet, as a by-product, each led to a significant alteration in how we punish convicts. In particular, Henry II's failure
to obtain jurisdiction over clerics illustrates this adventitious
development.
In the twelfth century, most offenses were capital unless
emended by payment.2 5 The only persons exempt from capital
punishment were clerics. In spiritual and temporal matters the Roman Catholic Church exercised exclusive jurisdiction over all clerics, even those admitted to minor orders. Therefore, the role of the
church and of the accused's relation to the church was crucial for
those who could not afford to pay compensation; church jurisdiction virtually guaranteed leniency of penalties, especially for firstoffenders. Church doctrine forbade sanguinary penalties, and what
was in law a capital offense under church rules became the subject
of demanding but not impossible penance.2 Because Henry II
failed in his attempt to gain jurisdiction over clerics who committed temporal offenses, this benefit evolved into one of the gentler
fictions of the common law: a man who could read, or appear to
read by having memorized, a designated passage of the Bible was
presumed to have been admitted to orders; in a basically illiterate
society, literacy was "proof" of church training.2 7 The subsequent
25. Id.
26. "A clerk found guilty of a crime could only be handed over to the bishop,
whd would do no more than degrade him from his orders." F. MAITLAND, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 229 (H. Fischer ed. 1963).

27. Benefit of clergy was originally available to anyone who could read because literacy was considered the mark of one who was admitted to orders. Except
for nuns, prior to the Reformation all women were excluded from the benefit of
clergy because they were incapable of being ordained. Also excluded were men
who had married two wives or one widow.
One claiming benefit of clergy was tried before the bishop with a jury of
twelve clerks. The accused was required to make an oath proclaiming his innocence. The oath of twelve compurgators was then taken, all of whom swore that
they believed the accused was telling the truth. The jury then rendered its verdict
and, if necessary, a penance was assigned by the bishop. The burden of proof was
on the clerk to make his purgation, and the king could not introduce evidence
against him.
Benefit of clergy was readily available for a first offense to men who could
read. In 1487 a law was enacted directing that all persons convicted of a clergyable offense be branded on the thumb. Thereafter, one who claimed benefit of
clergy a second time had to prove that he had actually been admitted to orders.
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incorporation of this seed of leniency into the legal process introduced reformation and rehabilitation as factors in sentencing.2 8 It

also undercut the previously unassailable entitlement of the king
to the whole of a man's goods upon conviction of a conimon, non-

treasonable offense.29 With the merger of church and state in the
reign of Henry VIII, the underlying principles of repentence and
personal reform inherent in first-offender laws became a significant
consideration in the judicial sentencing process and were no longer

exclusive to the exercise of royal clemency.30 A political conflict,
therefore, resulted in penal reform, the individual again benefitting

only as a by-product of the state's response to an infringement on
its authority.

Punishment, Profit and Resources
The role of national resources and profit has been perhaps the
most critical factor in the state's selection of its punishments. This
can be illustrated by England's use of convict labor to develop its
American and Australian colonies.
Historically, exile could be chosen by an accused felon as early
as the thirteenth century, 81 but the mass transportation of convicts
was not undertaken until col6nies were available in the sevenBenefit of clergy led to the lessening of severity of punishment for many common crimes. By the beginning of the eighteenth century all restrictions on benefit
of clergy had been removed and it was universally available. See 1 J. STEPHEN,
supra note 20, at 459-69; 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 17, at 441-57.
28. See 1 J. STEPHEN, supra note 20, at 463.
29. See 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 17, at 510-14.
30. The first benefit-of-clergy statute was enacted in 1487, four years before
Henry VIII ascended the throne. His unification of church and state made unnecessary the fiction that first (clergyable) offenders were to be treated more leniently solely because they were under a different jurisdiction. While offenses continued to be "clergyable" the benefit became an acknowledged fiction in state
prosecutions.
31. A form of banishment (abjuration of the realm) was permitted from
before the time of Henry III. It was offered as an alternative to trial to a refugee
who had successfully obtained sanctuary in a church. Pollock and Maitland report
that "large numbers of ... felons were induced to relieve England of their presence and were shipped off at Dover to France or Flanders." 2 POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, supra note 17, at 591. If the suspect accepted abjuration all his goods
were forfeited and his lands escheated to the crown. If he later returned to England without a royal pardon he was treated as an outlaw. Id. at 517, 590-91.
By statute, banishment became a penalty for common offenses in 1597. See
L. ORLAND, supra note 15, at 18.
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teenth century.32 Notwithstanding its humane effect in supplanting
the death penalty for offenses against property, the wholesale deportation of convicts was implemented with profit in mind. Transportees developed new territory,3 8 exploited its resources and
opened markets for British-based industries which were granted
monopolies on the sale and transportation of goods to the colonies.
Most merchandise was imported through English ports and taxed
by the Crown, and colonists were not permitted to purchase goods
from nearby colonies at cheaper prices. 8 ' The economic value of
convict transportation was threefold: forfeiture to the Crown of the
felons' goods and lands, a settlement corps for undeveloped new
territories, and tax revenue and market outlets to benefit England's entire economy.
Transportation and involuntary servitude were successful and
accepted punishments. They were also central to the decline of
capital punishment. The later loss of the colonies and lack of new
settlement territory catalyzed the need for imprisonment as the
dominant form of punishment. For as transportation diminished
and the death penalty continued on the books for most offenses,
juries composed of laymen consistently refused to return findings
of guilty for capital offenses once the penalty of transportation
could no longer be substituted for death8 Persistent jury nullification, therefore, forced Parliament to limit progressively the num3 Since the
ber of capital offenses.8
territories had by then been
32. Transportation of convicts to the American colonies extended from 1618
to 1776. Upon arrival the convict assumed the status of indentured servant for
one to five years. Between 1776 and 1786 there was a hiatus in transportation and
in 1787 transportation to Australian penal colonies began. Transportation was
abandoned as a penal policy in 1795 by which time approximately 135,000 convicts had been shipped to Australia. Id. at 18-19.

33. Special land grants were made to American colonists who imported convicts. Id. at 18.
34. For example, colonial production of woolens, hats and iron was limited in
favor of home-based British industries. The West Indies Act or Molasses Act of
1733 placed high duties on the products of French and Spanish West Indian colonies to force purchase of British colonial goods. See A. McLAUGHLIN, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATEs

35. See note 12 supra.
36. Id.

9-13 (1936).

In tandem with the public demand for non-capital penalties, the utilitarian
philosophers in England, most notably Jeremy Bentham, advocated abolition of

the death penalty and torture and advanced a combined deterrent-rehabilitative
rationale for punishment. They argued that moderate but certain punishment
would inhibit commission of crimes and that the goal of punishment, specifically
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closed to transportation, imprisonment became the alternative
form of punishment. Thus a punishment, i.e. transportation, that
was derived from a true resource, was replaced with imprisonment,
a pseudo-resource.
Professor Zimring observes that prison space is finite37 and
recommends that sentencing policy be viewed as "the rationing of
prison space as a scarce resource.""8 While this may be a good rubric for short-term adjustments of policy, the fact remains that
prison is not a resource. It is warehousing constructed and maintained at exorbitant cost 9 and its use returns no benefit to society.
Indeed, for people with prior convictions, as well as for first offenders, imprisonment substantially increases the likelihood that they
will commit further offenses after release.4 0 Prisons were developed
to bridge the gaps between loss of territory, the introduction of
reformation and deterrence as the theoretical bases of punishment
and a public demand for non-capital penalties. Imprisonment has
never progressed beyond being a stop-gap.
What history has taught us then, is that lasting and effective
penal reform evolves and is maintained because the state acts to
centralize its authority, to resolve a political crisis or to exploit
profitably its resources. That those reforms also serve the purposes
of the criminal law is of a secondary consequence. In modern
times, state authority is well centralized and political crises that
challenge it seldom reach a magnitude that would catalyze lasting
and effective penal reform. The profitable exploitation of resources
remains the key factor which will create effective penal reform.
of imprisonment, was the reformation of the criminal and his ultimate restoration
to society. Both Bentham in England and Benjamin Franklin and the Quaker Re-

formers in the United States were greatly influenced by Cesare Beccaria's ON
CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS, first published in 1764.
37. Zimring, supra note 1, at 17-18.
The Illinois Department of Corrections has reportedly projected a 1985
prison population that will be 25 per cent larger than the available prison space.
In the last seven years Illinois' adult prison population has increased 98 per cent,
but prison bed space has increased only 25 per cent. Chicago Sun Times, August

20, 1981, at 7.

38. Zimring, supra note 1, at 18.
39. For example, in Illinois it now costs in excess of $10,000 a year to maintain one prisoner for one year. The Illinois Department of Corrections budget is
nearly a quarter-billion dollars. Chicago Sun Times, supra note 37, at 7.
40. See L. ORLAND, supra note 15, at 37-41, 46. For a critique of some of the
studies relied on by Orland, see F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 234-41 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ZIMRING &
HAWKINS].
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What then, must we consider to be the punishment resources of
the present day?
Science and technology, the growth of which has outpaced the
loss of territorial resources, should now become the central aspect
around which our system of punishment is organized."' The products of the social and physical sciences are resources from which
we can extract a system of punishment aligned to the needs of the
state. They could be for us a resource pool analogous to territory.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: THE NEW RESOURCES FOR REFORM

The last two hundred years have produced tremendous insight
into human behavior from the physical and social sciences. Relationships have been established between individual criminal behavior and factors such as physiological dysfunctions, early childhood experiences, 42 environment and peer acceptance.4 3 Crime and
recidivism have been linked to unemployment, and the crime rate
may be influenced by the perceived certainty of detection and punishment. 4 The problem we face is the effective integration of this
information into the legal system.
The law's treatment of science and empirical data has ranged
from outright rejection through grudging acceptance to blind assimilation of conclusions without testing for their impact on legal
41. Professor Zimring notes a probation-imprisonment ratio of 3.2 to 1 (Zimring, supra note 1, at n.25), which on its face suggests that non-incarceration

sentences are the principal sanction in our criminal justice system. I consider imprisonment (or incarceration in jail) the central or organizing punishment because
it is uniformly available for most misdemeanors and felonies. For example, in Illinois there are seven categories of felony, including murder, Class X, and conviction as an habitual offender; imprisonment is a possible sentence for all of them
and a mandatory sentence for three. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1 (1980).
Illinois has three categories of misdemeanor, any one of which carry a possible jail sentence. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-3 (1979).
The imposition of imprisonment illustrates our reliance on incarceration. The
Illinois Department of Corrections reports the increase in serious crime from 1972
to 1979 at 24 per cent, but the number of people sent to prison during the same
time span is reported to have increased 142 per cent. The latter increase is in part
attributed to determinate sentencing. Chicago Sun Times, supra note 37, at 7.
42. See K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT (1968), especially chs. 7 &
8.

43. See M. CLINARD & R.
1973).
44. See E. VAN DEN HAAG,
supra note 40.

QUINNEY, CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR SYSTEMS
PUNISHING CRIMINALS

61 (2d ed.

(1975); ZIMRING & HAWKINS,
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values."5 In the "laboratory of the states" a certain perversity has
undercut valid experimentation. In the last two hundred years we
have not answered or adequately addressed certain critical questions: "What punishment deters crime?" and "What punishment
rehabilitates the criminal?" These questions must be answered to
develop and apply sound legal analysis to the issue of punishment.
Potentially valid experiments have been thwarted by premature
revision or by methodological incompleteness. Two examples, one
historical, one modern, will serve to illustrate.
In 1790, Quaker reformers in Pennsylvania obtained space in
the Walnut Street Jail for the first penitentiary-literally a refuge
in which a convict was expected to reflect on his errors, read
scripture and be reformed through self-examination." In theory,
sentences were indeterminate and the convict was to be freed when
rehabilitated. The experiment failed because, before any results
could be evaluated, the Pennsylvania legislature authorized determinate sentences which guaranteed release irrespective of rehabilitation. This eviscerated the convict's assumed motivation to reform in order to be released-an essential component of the
hypothesis behind the practice. Furthermore, commitment rates
were so high that the benign, contemplative atmosphere planned
by the Quakers succumbed to scarcity and overcrowding. Irrespective of our individual opinions of this Quaker ideal, we will never
know whether it would have worked.
In brief, this is the history of punishment in the United
States. Legislatures authorized construction of prisons the designs
of which, by the time they were completed, were no longer considered manageable by penologists. 47 Sentences are still set on the basis of penological or sociological hypotheses predicated on the existence of prison systems or reforms that have rarely, if ever, seen
the light of day in the states.
A similarly self-defeating process occurred with the current
Illinois determinate sentencing revision.48 As noted by Professor
45. See generally, THE

USE/NONUSE/MISUSE

OF APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH IN

THE COURTS (M. Saks and C. Baron eds. 1980). For an in-depth analysis of how
statistical methods have been applied to particular legal issues (e.g., jury discrimination and guilty pleas), see M. FINKELSTEIN, QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN LAW
(1978).

46. See Dershowitz, From Punishment to Rehabilitation,in F. ZIMRING & R.

FRASE, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 720, 722-24 (1980).

47. See L. ORLAND, supra note 15, at 50-55.
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-3 (1979).
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Zimring, the legislation was the product of political "law and or-

der" rhetoric and, for all its facial determinacy, it left intact the
prosecutor's bargaining discretion and much of the judge's sen-

tencing discretion. It also increased the state's attorney's bargaining power. The publicized debates surrounding its passage reflect a
broad deterrent purpose: the "message" to would-be' lawbreakers
was a "get-tough" policy. ' 9 What makes this reform a prime exampile of legislative lapse is that by grafting determinate sentences
onto a pre-existing code and administrative system, the legislature
did nothing to enhance the crucial aspect of deterrence-certainty.

Recent analyses made in the behavioral and social sciences
confirm the intuitions of Beccaria and Bentham that the appearance of certainty of punishment probably has a general deterrent
effect, which operates independently of the magnitude of the punishment or the length of imprisonment imposed. Illinois' determinate sentencing seems made to order. However, the appearance of

certainty necessary for general deterrence must be systemic. The
available studies define "certainty" as the likelihood of apprehension, prosecution and conviction, as well as certainty of incarcera-

tion.50 The potential criminal must perceive an unprofitable likelihood not only that he will be caught, but also that he will be tried
quickly, without the opportunity to exhaust prosecution witnesses
through repeated continuances, without the opportunity to bargain
down the charge to a non-incarceration offense,51 and with a certainty that he will be punished if convicted. These integral aspects
49. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(3) (1980) provides: "for a Class X felony, the sentence [of imprisonment] shall be not less than 6 years and not more
than 30 years."
Probation, conditional discharge and periodic imprisonment are not permitted as alternatives to imprisonment. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3(c)(2)(C)
(1979).
The proponents of determinate sentencing asserted that the mandatory imposition of prison terms for Class X offenses (aggravated kidnapping for ransom,
rape, deviate sexual assault, heinous battery, home invasion, armed robbery and
aggravated arson) would deter commission of those offenses.

50. See E. VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 44. But see ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra

note 40, at 70-90.
51. But see M. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 45, at 263-87 for an analysis of the
likelihood that the plea negotiation process is used to obtain convictions in cases
that would otherwise have resulted in verdicts of not guilty. This analysis was
undertaken in response to the decisions in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742
(1970) and Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), which "manifest an assumption that those who are induced to plead guilty would, in any event, be convicted." M. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 45, at 264.
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of applied deterrence theory were by-passed in Illinois. The resulting legislation did not use the resources of scientific research and
as a result provides only for special deterrence-the assurance that
the felony offender (if apprehended, convicted and sentenced to
imprisonment) will be isolated from the general public for a minimal term of years. As Professor Zimring points out, this nominally
determinate system assures us of only one result-an increase in
the number of people sent to prison.52
These are by no means isolated examples of legislative frustration of the following necessity: an integration of both theoretical
and technological resources and legal standards for problem-resolution." They do, however, highlight another significant aspect of
what Professor Zimring titles "negative coalition." One of the costs
of compromise inherent in the political process approach to sentencing reform, a compromise not only on methods but on the very
definition of the "problem," is the sacrifice of carefully constructed, consistently executed and controlled social experiments.
Until agreement can be reached that our best resources to create
penal reform lie with our science and technology, that resource will
remain untapped, the determinate/indeterminate debate will rage
on, and the prisons will continue to fill.
CONCLUSION

The exploitation of territorial and economic resources has
been the key impetus of "penal reform." Imprisonment exists as an
inhumane and self-defeating compromise in the face of limited
traditional resources of territory, unexploited available resources of
science and technology and our unwillingness to return to flogging,
mutilation and a widespread death penalty. Punishment must reaffirm state authority and enhance, or at least not detract from,
the economic well-being of the state. The products of science and
52. See note 4 supra.
53. As a product of applied social and behavioral science, probation is a cautionary example. The adaption of mandatory incarceration in Illinois may reflect
a growing protest against the probationary release of convicted felons. The danger
is that non-incarcerative punishments will be socially rejected, not because of any
intrinsic defect in this system, but because our legal system is deficient in the way
it integrates the products of empiricism into the rule-making process. An example
of how technology can be applied in the criminal sentencing process is the Los
Angeles' experiment in which the cars of convicted drunk drivers were equipped
with a computer controlled reflex-evaluation test that prevented the car from
starting if the driver did not "pass."
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technology are the only new resources we have for socially beneficial and individually productive forms of punishment. Our inability to marshall these resources is attributable to legislative and judicial misapplication or non-use of empirically-derived hypotheses
and to the frustration of otherwise valid experiments. The burden
now on the legal system is one of consistent self-discipline and
careful scrutiny when implementing policy changes. The intellectual and economic travesty of Illinois' so-called determinate sentencing simply should not exist. Had it been tested against the essential components of deterrence analysis provided by science and
technology, it would not exist.
To tap science and technology effectively, much of which is
conceptual, our decision-making processes must be aligned with
the hypothesis, experiment and evaluation methodology of science.
Courts and legislatures must hold themselves and each other accountable for the rationales they advance in support of state practices, be they determinate or indeterminate sentencing, probation
or social programs. This alignment of the legal decision-making
process with the experimental method is the first essential step toward reform and away from the revisionism that has dominated
sentencing for the last two hundred years. It is the threshhold to
what is today our largest pool of resources.

